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Abstract The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided
by Lewis in ‘‘Elusive Knowledge’’ is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between
what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what
describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in
favour of Holliday’s (2015) claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid.
However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that
counterexamples to the negative iteration principle (:Kp ! K:Kp) come out as
elusive: such counterexamples can occur only in possibilities which the attributors
of knowledge are ignoring. This consequence is more defensible than it might look
at first sight.
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One of the most influential versions of epistemic contextualism is the one Lewis
develops in ‘‘Elusive Knowledge’’.1 Despite its influence, this account is not always
well understood. One place where matters are particularly unclear is the status of
knowledge iteration principles in Lewis’s account. Several authors [including
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Williamson (2001, 2009), Holton (2003), and Greco (2014), who all trace the claim
to Lloyd Humberstone] maintain that Lewis’s account validates an S5 epistemic
logic, which would mean that it is committed to implausibly strong iteration
principles for knowledge; by contrast, Holliday (2015) maintains that the knowledge
iteration principles are invalid in Lewis’s system.
By distinguishing carefully between what is contributed by the conversational
context of the agents attributing knowledge and what is contributed by the situation
of the subject to whom knowledge is attributed, we can resolve this dispute in
Holliday’s favour: Lewis’s system allows counterexamples to both the KK principle
(that whenever someone knows something, they know that they know it) and what I
will call the K:K principle (that whenever someone doesn’t know something, they
know that they don’t know it). However, we can also see that this is not the end of
the story: counterexamples to the K:K principle can only occur at worlds that the
attributors of knowledge are ignoring. (No analogous result holds for the KK
principle.) On the face of it, this surprising consequence of Lewis’s account looks
almost as implausible as the claim that the K:K principle is valid. However, I will
argue that there are ways of rendering the consequence acceptable.2 Throughout the
paper, I will try to draw more general lessons about the relationship between
epistemic contextualism and the knowledge iteration principle, explaining why their
interaction is both subtle and fruitful.
1 Lewis, formalized
Discussions of epistemic logic standardly proceed in a possible worlds framework,
in which an agent X is said to know p at w if and only if every world accessible from
w (under the accessibility relation associated with X) is a p-world. Lewis seems to
proceed similarly. Consider, for example, his well-known summary of the account:
X knows that P iff X’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P –
Psst! – except for those possibilities that we [attributors] are properly ignoring.
(1996, p.554)
This seems to translate quite straightforwardly into the traditional framework: we
simply say that a world is accessible if it is neither properly ignored nor ruled out by
X’s evidence.3 One would thus expect it to be relatively straightforward to distil a
logic from Lewis’s account. However, as we will see shortly, there are some pitfalls
here to be navigated.
2 I actually think that, in addition to it not being obviously false, there are positive reasons to want
something like the Lewisian treatment of K:K to be correct. For, as I hope to show in future work, it
allows us to solve hard problems for the (thoroughly non-Lewisian) thesis, defended by Williamson
(2000), that one’s evidence consists of all and only the claims that one knows.
3 This is not quite right as an interpretation of Lewis, since he uses ‘possibilities’ to mean something
slightly different from possible worlds (1996, p. 552). To keep the formalization of his account
manageable, I ignore that complication here.
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To proceed with the approach just sketched, it is natural to look to ‘frames’ that
consist of a set of worlds W, together with a specification of how Lewis’s primitives
behave at the various worlds; we can then see what happens when we define
accessibility in terms of these primitives. Deciding on how to represent the
primitives, however, requires some care. For Lewis’s theory is, above all, a
contextualist theory. This means that whether an attribution of knowledge correctly
describes a situation depends on both features of the situation described and features
of the context from which the attribution was made. However, only the features of
the situation (the ‘world of evaluation’) will vary as we consider what an agent
knows in different possible worlds; we are interested in the logic of ‘knows’ within
a single context, and so whatever is supplied by context will remain fixed. Our
frames thus need to represent the features of the situation as world-relative, but can
represent the contributions of the context absolutely. Whether something is a feature
of the situation described or of the context of ascription thus matters greatly to how
our frames should represent it.
1.1 A natural mistake
How does this distinction between features of the context and features of the
situation described apply to Lewis’s account? The above summary of the account
suggests that the correctness of knowledge attributions depends on two components:
(i) what evidence the subject has, which we can represent by a relation E so that
wEv iff v is compatible with the evidence X has in w, and (ii) a set S of possibilities
that are not being properly ignored. The first of these is clearly a feature of the
situation described; the second looks, at least at first sight, like a feature of the
context—that’s why it seemed natural to represent it absolutely, i.e. as a set rather
than a function from possibilities to the set of worlds ignored at that possibility.
We will see shortly that this approach isn’t textually plausible. Nonetheless, it is
worth briefly exploring it, since it helps explain the appeal of the idea that Lewis’s
account vindicates an S5 logic. For the current proposal would see Lewis vindicate
the iteration principles. Lewis views a subject’s ‘evidence’ as her total phenomenal
state, so that wEv if and only if the subject is in the same total phenomenal state in w
and v; this makes E an equivalence relation. The obvious definition of RK , the
accessibility relation for our subject’s knowledge, holds that wRKv if and only if
wEv and v 2 S, so that an agent knows p only if her evidence eliminates all the
unignored p-worlds. And on this definition, RK will be transitive and Euclidean.
4
We thus validate both the KK principle (Kp ! KKpÞ and the K:K principle
(:Kp ! K:Kp).
However, we don’t quite vindicate a full S5 logic. The missing principle is the
most basic one: that what is known must be true. For note that no world outside of S
will be accessible to any world under RK , not even to itself. RK thus isn’t reflexive,
and so we do not validate the T principle (Kp ! p); in worlds outside S, people can
4 To see that it’s transitive, note that from xRKy and yRKz it follows that z 2 S and xEy and yEz. So z 2 S
and xEz (since E is transitive), and so xRKz. To see that it’s Euclidean, note that if xRKy and xRKz, then
z 2 S and xEy and xEz. So z 2 S and yEz (since E is euclidean), and hence yRKz.
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know things that aren’t true there. This is a clear sign that something has gone
wrong; the factivity of knowledge is not only epistemologically non-negotiable, but
also a feature Lewis (1996, p. 554) specifically intended his account to vindicate.
We run into this problem with factivity because our logic is sensitive to how
knowledge behaves in possibilities that are properly ignored. Since Lewis
(1996, pp. 555–559) explains that such possibilities are neither actual nor salient,
this sensitivity might seem excessive.5 It can be avoided by redefining validity as
truth at every not-properly-ignored-world in every model;6 this would, in fact, allow
us to vindicate a full S5 logic.7 However, RK won’t be reflexive even on this revised
approach, suggesting that the original problem has been hidden rather than solved.
One way to bring this out is by considering what happens when we introduce other
modal operators. For suppose we introduce an operator h for metaphysical
necessity. It seems plausible that some worlds outside S are metaphysically possible
with respect to some worlds in S in at least some models. But then hðKp ! pÞ will
not be a principle of the combined logic of knowledge and metaphysical necessity.
This strikes me as no less serious than the original problem of allowing for actual
factivity failures.
Our simple-minded approach, whilst hospitable to the iteration principles, thus
has consequences which are both extremely unattractive and difficult to eliminate.
The culprit seems to be the fact that the set of relevant possibilities that need to be
eliminated is treated as something entirely supplied by context. For this means that
the relevant possibilities cannot vary when we evaluate a knowledge attribution at
different worlds; but this, in turn, implies that some possibilities aren’t relevant to
themselves, so that agents at those possibilities can eliminate all relevant :p-worlds
(and thus know p) even though p is false. We thus fail to capture the factivity of
knowledge.
1.2 Doing better
Fortunately, Lewis’s discussion does not commit him to such an inadequate
account. It is true that which possibilities are being ignored is settled by the context.
5 In an unpublished manuscript, Julien Dutant identifies a ‘‘rigid interpretation’’ of Lewis’s semantics,
shows how it conflicts with the factivity of knowledge, and then considers a response analogous to this
one. He observes that, even once we acknowledge such a response, the interpretation still predicts that the
sentence ‘someone could have known something false’ could be true, which is the inspiration for the
objection I offer below.
6 A variant of this is more familiar in modal logic. We could move to ‘model structures’ \W;E; S;w[
which designate world w 2 W as the actual world. Since the actual world is never properly ignored, we
would then want to impose the structural requirement that w 2 S. When working with model structures
instead of frames, it’s also natural to redefine validity as truth at the designated world of every model. The
resulting system is very similar to the one discussed in the main text; in particular, it validates S5 for
essentially the same reason.
7 Why? Let us say that v can be reached from w if there are worlds u1; . . .un such that
wRKu1; u1RKu2; . . .unRKv. Then truth in a model depends only on what happens in worlds that are
either in S or can be reached from a world in S. Moreover, the definition of RK ensures that all such worlds
are themselves in S. Finally, RK is an equivalence relation when restricted to S (though not outside it).
Together, these facts ensure that we validate an S5 logic.
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But Lewis defines knowledge in terms of proper ignoring, and it is far from obvious
that it is the context which settles which ignorings are proper. In fact, when Lewis,
in introducing the ‘Rule of Actuality’, explicitly discusses this issue, he asserts that
propriety is (at least partially) determined by the world of evaluation:
The possibility that actually obtains is never properly ignored. ...Whose
actuality? Ours, when we ascribe knowledge or ignorance to others? Or the
subject’s? ...[T]he right answer is that it is the subject’s actuality, not the
ascriber’s, that never can be properly ignored. (1996, p.554f)
‘‘The subject’s actuality’’ seems to be the world of evaluation;8 so what can be
properly ignored depends on what the world of evaluation is. We therefore need to
reinterpret S to represent only what is contributed by the context. Plausibly, that is
the set of worlds that are not in fact ignored by the attributors; this set will thus leave
out worlds that are ignored but only improperly so. This is how ‘S’ will be
interpreted from here on in. In addition to this reinterpretation, we need to enrich
our frames to represent directly all the features of the worlds that constrain what can
be properly ignored relative to each of them.
What features are these? Lewis articulates the limits of proper ignoring by appeal
to the Rules of Actuality, Belief, and Resemblance.9 The information relevant to the
Rule of Actuality is trivially represented in the frame, since every world is actual
relative to itself. So the first addition is the notion of the subject’s beliefs,10 which
we will need to implement the ‘Rule of Belief’ stating that ‘‘a possibility that the
subject believes to obtain is not properly ignored’’ (1996, p. 555f). Following the
standard formalization of belief, we can represent this by an accessibility relation RB
on worlds, where wRBv is understood as ‘v is consistent with all of X’s beliefs in w.’
The second addition required to constrain proper ignoring is that of relevant
similarity, which we will need to implement the ‘Rule of Resemblance’:
Suppose one possibility saliently resembles another. Then if one of them may
not be properly ignored [in virtue of rules other than this rule], neither may the
other. (1996, p.556)
8 In the unpublished manuscript mentioned in footnote 5, Dutant argues that ‘‘the subject’s actuality’’
might be construed instead as the (potentially counterfactual) world on which the conversation is focused;
this would allow for context alone to determine propriety. I agree that such a reading is just about
possible. But since it would leave us with the unsatisfactory account discussed in Sect. 1.1, and the
context of the passage strongly suggests that Lewis is trying to rule out this variant account, I think it safe
to assume that this is not how Lewis intended these remarks.
9 What is the role of the ‘permissive’ rules, such as the Rules of Reliability, Method, and Conservatism
(1996, pp. 558–559)? I have to confess to finding these rather puzzling. As I understand Lewis, any world
that isn’t being attended to is automatically ignored, and thus properly ignored if no ‘restrictive’ rule
prevents this from happening. But then what role could there be for the permissive rules to play? One
hypothesis is that they aren’t rules about the propriety of ignoring at all, but are rather empirical
generalizations about what kind of worlds are in fact ignored in ordinary contexts. Another thought,
suggested to me by Bob Stalnaker, is that they function as constraints on what ‘restrictive’ rules Lewis
would be willing to add to his account: they had better be consistent with it being proper, except in very
specific circumstances, to ignore worlds in which our faculties and methods are unreliable.
10 Or what the agent should believe, but I will set that complication aside.
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Since it is context, rather than the world of evaluation, which determines which
respects of similarity are salient, this can be represented by a binary relation ‘C’ (for
‘closeness’) with wCv read as ‘w is close to/relevantly resembles v’. Crucially, we
may not assume that C is transitive, since Lewis is at pains to distinguish between
worlds resembling each other and worlds being connected by a chain of resembling
worlds.
A full Lewisian frame is thus a 5-tuple \W ;E; S;RB;C[ ; such a frame does
better at representing the information needed for an adequate formalization. For we
can now define proper ignoring in a way which ensures that different possibilities
are properly ignored relative to different worlds of evaluation. According to Lewis,
the worlds not properly ignored relative to w are (i) w itself (to respect the Rule of
Actuality), (ii) the worlds consistent with X’s beliefs at w (to respect the Rule of
Belief)11 (iii) the salient worlds S (to respect the Rule of Attention), and (iv) any
world close to those mentioned in (i)–(iii) (to respect the Rule of Resemblance).
We formalize this thought by defining an ‘alternatives’ function A : W ! PðWÞ,
which takes each world w to its alternatives, i.e. the possibilities not properly
ignored relative to w. We first implement (i)–(iii) to define an impoverished function
A, and then ‘fill it in’ to define an A which also respects (iv):
AðwÞ ¼def fwg [ fv : wRBvg [ S
AðwÞ ¼def fu : 9v 2 AðwÞs:t:uCvg
We then use A together with E to define the accessibility relation for knowledge RK
in the natural way: for all worlds u and v,
uRKv if and only if uEv and v 2 AðuÞ:
The resulting system is essentially a special case of Holliday’s (2015) formalization
of Lewis.12 Simplifying slightly, Holliday’s frames are, in our notation, the triples
\W ;E;A[ ; the rule of actuality is built in by requiring that w 2 AðwÞ. Our models
are less general, because defining A in terms of S, RB, and C imposes additional
constraints.13 Formally, this lesser generality will generate the surprising new result
discussed in Sect. 2; and at an informal level, I hope that building up A in the way I
have done (and making explicit the rival approach discussed in Sect. 1.1) helps clarify
why this really is the right way to formalize Lewis.
11 Given the above statement of the rule of belief, one might worry that this is much too strong: there,
Lewis seems to say that a possibility believed to obtain isn’t properly ignored, not that a possibility not
believed not to obtain isn’t properly ignored. But Lewis later clarifies that what he really means is that ‘‘a
possibility may not be properly ignored if the subject gives it [...] a degree of belief that is sufficiently
high,’’ (1996, p. 556) and context makes clear that ‘‘sufficiently high’’ is usually far below .5 (as it has to
be, since otherwise almost no reasonable agent will have a ‘‘sufficiently high’’ degree of belief in any
single possibility). So ‘the worlds consistent with X’s beliefs’ is a better approximation of Lewis’s rule
than ‘the world (if there is one) uniquely consistent with X’s beliefs.’ It is nonetheless merely an
approximation of what Lewis was after; one consequence of this choice will be that, contrary to Lewis’s
(1996, p. 556) explicit intentions, our formalization will not allow for knowledge without belief in cases
like that of the reliable but underconfident examinee.
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for extremely helpful discussion on this point.
13 Though Holliday (2013) considers imposing the constraint corresponding to the rule of belief.
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What, then, are the formal features of this system? Unlike the first attempt, it has
no trouble accounting for the factivity of knowledge. And the way this account
implements the rule of belief means that we almost validate the principle that
everything known is believed.
(But only almost: as Ichikawa (2011a, p. 386) points out, Lewis’s account
implies that if a proposition p is entailed by an agent’s evidence, she automatically
knows p, regardless of whether she believes it. In fact, she can know p whilst
believing its negation: while A(w) will contain the :p-worlds compatible with the
subject’s beliefs, those will then be ruled out by her evidence, and thus no longer
accessible under RK . This is a bad result even if, like Lewis (1996, p. 556), we think
that the connection between knowledge and belief is rather loose. But it seems to me
an unavoidable feature of Lewis’s thought that we know everything that is true in all
the possibilities compatible with our evidence. Of course, we can reject this thought
to preserve the link between belief and knowledge, e.g. by replacing E with E [ RB
in the definition of RK . Alternatively, we can hold onto the Lewisian thought (and
hence the original definition), and simply admit that, in so doing, we are restricting
our attention to somewhat idealized agents who believe everything their evidence
entails.14 Since our models, as is standard, already build in a variety of similar
idealizations, such as the assumption that agents always know and believe logical
consequences of what they know and believe, I will opt for this simpler approach.)
As Holliday points out, however, this system does not provide a hospitable
environment for the iteration principles. For consider the three world model on
which (a) x is the only salient world, (b) x is the only world compatible with our
agent’s beliefs in any of the three worlds, (c) x resembles y and y resembles z but x
does not resemble z, and (d) our agent’s evidence at each of the worlds is compatible
with her inhabiting any of them. These facts can be visually represented as follows,
with continuous lines standing for RB, dotted lines standing for C, and worlds in
S occurring inside the circle (information about E, being trivial, is omitted):
Then, under RK , x will access only itself and y, whilst y and z both access all three
worlds. Letting continuous lines now stand for RK , we can represent this as follows:
Now let p be a claim that is true in x and y, but false in z. Since p is true at both x
and y, Kp will be true at x; but since p is false at z, Kp will be false at y. So KKp will
fail at x even though Kp was true there, and so we have a counterexample to the KK
14 That is, we require that, in all our models, wRBv entails wEv. Cf Holliday (2013).
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principle. The same model also provides a counterexample to the K:K principle,
since :Kp will be true at y and z but K:Kp will be false at both.15
It is worth noting that these results are independently attractive. The K:K
principle in particular seems clearly invalid: someone who reasonably believes
something false fails to know but doesn’t know (and needn’t be in a position to
know) that he so fails. And Lewis seems to be trying to do justice to this thought.
Thus he (1996, p. 554) describes his account as ‘‘‘externalist’—the subject himself
may not be able to tell what is properly ignored.’’ But this is inconsistent with the
iteration principles, since the subject could use his knowledge of what he knows to
work back to what is being properly ignored.16
2 Elusive K:K
Getting clear on whether the iteration principles are valid in Lewis’s system matters if
we are interested in what Lewis thought. It also matters if we want to appeal to their
status in Lewis’s system either to bolster the plausibility of a principle [as Greco
(2014) does in appealing to the claim that Lewis’s system vindicates the KK principle]
or to criticize Lewis’s account [as Williamson (2001) does, in saying that Lewis’s
system vindicates the K:K principle]. But there is also a more surprising reason for
noting that Lewis’s account does not, in fact, validate the iteration principles: theK:K
principle turns out to have a different but still unusual status in this system.
For suppose we may assume that, on any interpretation of ‘knows’, the agent in
question always knows what her beliefs are.17 Then we can show that theK:K principle
has no counterexamples in any of the worlds that are in fact salient to the attributors:18
ElusiveK:K. For any w 2 S and proposition p;:Kp ! K:Kp is true at w.
Proof Suppose that :Kp is true at w 2 S. Then there must be some v at which p is
false such that wRKv, which implies v 2 AðwÞ. Now let u be any world such that
15 It’s worth noting that, while the counterexample to KK relies on the intransitivity of C, the
counterexample to K:K does not. For we can simply drop y from the example, rendering C irrelevant; the
resulting model will validate KK, but K:K will still fail at z.
16 Moreover, Bob Stalnaker tells me that, while Lewis initially thought that his theory should satisfy an
S5 logic, he became convinced of the implausibility of the K:K principle whilst presenting early versions
of ‘‘Elusive Knowledge’’. This change of heart coincided with the introduction of his extended discussion
of the Rule of Actuality, and we saw earlier that this is the crucial passage warning us against the
iteration-friendly formalization of Sect. 1.1.
17 Formally: 8x8yðxRKy ! 8zðxRBz $ yRBzÞÞ. Given Lewis’s account, this claim can be true on every
interpretation of ‘knows’ only if a difference in beliefs always makes for a difference in phenomenal
state; Smithies (2014) develops a notion of ‘phenomenal state’ designed to have this feature, and argues
that one’s justification supervenes on what phenomenal state (in this sense) one is in, so this might be a
way of incorporating the introspection assumption into a broadly Lewisian account. It’s also worth noting
that, even if we deny that agents in general always know what they believe, it is still interesting and
surprising that the Lewisian account predicts our result to hold of those that do.
18 Recall that the actual world may not be salient to the attributors; the result thus doesn’t entail that the
K:K principle will be true.
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wRKu. We will begin by showing that v 2 AðuÞ: we argue that, since v 2 AðwÞ, one
of four conditions must hold, and that any of these are sufficient to ensure that
v 2 AðuÞ.
(i) v 2 AðwÞ because v ¼ w. Since w 2 S, this ensures that v 2 AðuÞ.
(ii) v 2 AðwÞ because wRBv. Since wRKu, it follows from our introspection
assumption that uRBv also. So v 2 AðuÞ.
(iii) v 2 AðwÞ because v 2 S. Then v 2 AðuÞ also.
(iv) v 2 AðwÞ but v 62 AðwÞ. Then there must be an x 2 AðwÞ such that vCx.
But, then x must meet one of conditions (i)–(iii), and so x 2 AðuÞ. So v 2
AðuÞ also.
So v 2 AðuÞ. Since wRKv and wRKu, we have wEv and wEu, which implies uEv
since E is an equivalence relation. So uRKv. So Kp is false at u also. Since u was an
arbitrary world satisfying wRKu, it follows that K:Kp is true at w. Since w was an
arbitrary member of S and p an arbitrary proposition, this establishes the result. h
This result is extremely surprising; it seems to say that we can never attend to
agents who are unaware of the fact that they fail to know something, that
counterexamples to the K:K principle are elusive. That sounds obviously false: the
K:K principle isn’t just invalid, but subject to clear counterexamples which we
have no trouble thinking about. I will argue shortly that things may not be quite so
straightforward; but first, we should attempt to understand why Lewis’s account has
this kind of consequence.
Counterexamples to K:K seem easy to come by: just pick an agent who has a
belief which, while it looks good ‘from the inside’, falls short of knowledge because
of an uncooperative environment. To have a concrete example, consider someone
whose belief that the wall in front of her is red falls short of knowledge because the
lighting is unreliable. Since the belief ‘looks good from the inside’ our agent must
have evidence that rules out the kind of :p-possibilities that any would-be knower
has to rule out, such as possibilities in which the wall is and looks yellow. Since,
nonetheless, her belief doesn’t amount to knowledge, there must be some other,
more idiosyncratic, :p-possibilities, that are relevant to her because her actual
environment is uncooperative, and which her evidence doesn’t eliminate; in our
example, these would be possibilities in which the wall is white but the lighting is
misleading. (These possibilities might be either actual, or relevantly similar to the
one that is actual; it doesn’t matter which.) But now suppose, for reductio, that our
agent’s actual circumstances are salient. Then, according to Lewis, we will use
‘knowledge’ in such a way that anyone has to rule out these supposedly
‘idiosyncratic’ possibilities to count as knowing by the standards of the current
conversation; for, by the rules of attention and resemblance, any would-be knower
has to rule every possibility which is either salient or relevantly similar to one that is
salient. And so the error possibilities cannot be idiosyncratic to our subject after all,
contradicting our assumption. So, if a case like that of misleading lighting is salient,
it cannot, after all, be a case in which our agent fails to know without knowing that
she fails.
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What is generating the result is thus the feature of contextualism that was also
responsible for the weird consequences of the naive formalization in Sect. 1.1: that
something contributed by the conversational context (now: the set S of salient
possibilities) is independent of the world of evaluation. This means that, once a
possibility (such as the possibility of misleading lighting) is in S, any would-be
knower has to eliminate it, regardless of what his or her world is like. Since rational
K:K failures intuitively arise from error possibilities that are specific to the subject
who fails to know, this has the surprising consequence that the error possibilities
generating the counterexample to K:K must not themselves be salient (or relevantly
similar to possibilities that are salient.) And that’s just another way of saying that
counterexamples to K:K occur only in possibilities that aren’t in S.
Interestingly, we get no analogue of ElusiveK:K for the KK-principle; in fact,
the model described in Sect. 1.2 already showed that KK can fail even at a salient
possibility. This reveals quite how different the counterexamples to these two
principles are on the Lewisian treatment. KK fails because C isn’t transitive:
someone’s evidence can rule out all the worlds resembling the actual one, without
thereby ruling out all the worlds resembling some world that resembles the actual
one. By contrast, K:K fails because agents sometimes reasonably think they can
ignore possibilities which, because of facts specific to their actual situation, turn out
to be relevant. Making the actual world salient, and thereby forcing it to be relevant
no matter what, prevents the second of these but leaves the first untouched.
Now that we understand a little better why Lewis’s account entails ElusiveK:K,
we can turn to examine whether this is problematic. At first sight, it seems terrible.
We can describe clear and concrete counterexamples to the K:K principle; and
ElusiveK:K seems to predict that we can’t. But matters are not quite so
straightforward. In Sects. 2.1 and 2.2 I will describe two ways in which Lewisians
can respond. The first yields no ground at all, and argues that we can still do justice
to the clear examples; the second is more conciliatory, taking ElusiveK:K to
motivate a different conception of what it is to ‘ignore’ a possibility.19 Each, I think,
has promise; so the fact that Lewis’s account entails ElusiveK:K doesn’t refute
that account.
2.1 The hard-nosed response
The Lewisian who wants to yield no ground has his work cut out for him. There are
two natural ways of understanding Lewis’s talk of ‘ignoring’; and the prediction that
K:K failures happen only in ignored possibilities looks implausible on either one.
The first way of understanding ‘ignore’ is more prominent in Lewis’s discussion: a
possibility isn’t ignored if it is psychologically salient, if we are thinking or talking
about it. But sometimes Lewis instead writes of which possibilities are compatible
with our presuppositions; or, as I shall put it, which possibilities we take seriously.
19 A more radically conciliatory response would give up on the thought that worlds that aren’t ignored
always need to be eliminated. To preserve any of the Lewisian spirit, we would then have to offer a
different account of the role S plays in defining A or A.
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And, as Blome-Tillman (2009, 2014) emphasizes, what is salient and what is taken
seriously need not coincide. I tell you that the wall in the seminar room is red. You
raise the worry that the lighting might have been misleading. When I discover that
you have no special reason to think so, I tell you to stop being so tedious. Even
though you have made the possibility of misleading lighting salient, I refuse to take
it seriously and continue to presuppose that it does not obtain.
There are a number of independent reasons why understanding ‘ignore’ in terms
of presuppositions is more attractive than understanding it in terms of salience.20 To
these we can add that this way of understanding ‘ignore’ helps reconcile
ElusiveK:K with the possibility of clear counterexamples to K:K when these
counterexamples are thought of hypothetically. I claim to know that the wall is red. I
agree that it’s not impossible for the lighting to be unreliable and that, if it had been
unreliable, my belief that the wall is red would have fallen short of knowledge
without my knowing that it did. Perhaps I even agree that if, contra everything I
believe, the lighting was unreliable this time, my actual belief falls short of
knowledge even though I do not know that it does. But I continue to presuppose that
the antecedents of these conditionals are false. So that speech is no counterexample
to ElusiveK:K (when ‘ignore’ is understood as ‘don’t take seriously’) since the
possibility in which I locate the counterexamples to K:K, being inconsistent with
my presuppositions, isn’t in S.
However, there are also clear counterexamples to K:K that needn’t be described
hypothetically; these are most naturally described as cases in which the subject
differs from the attributors. My friend Soraya says that the wall in the other room is
red. But we know that the lighting in that room is unreliable. So it seems that we can
rightly judge that Soraya fails to know but doesn’t know that she so fails. After all,
we know that (i) her belief, being formed in poor conditions, can’t be knowledge,
and (ii) she doesn’t (and has no reason to) suspect, much less believe, that she
doesn’t know. In fact, she seems to think that she does know – otherwise she
wouldn’t have felt so confident in telling me the color of the wall. But her case is
both salient to us and compatible with our presuppositions, since we believe it to be
actual. Doesn’t that refute ElusiveK:K?
Perhaps not. It does seem clear that we can judge that Soraya doesn’t know but
doesn’t know she doesn’t know. But it isn’t clear that ‘know’ is interpreted relative
to the possibilities salient to us throughout that judgement; and if it’s not, the
possibility of this judgement needn’t conflict with the Lewisian result. For
ElusiveK:K entails only that knowledge-relative-to-S behaves in line with K:K
throughout S; it makes no predictions about the behaviour of knowledge-relative-to-
S0, nor about principles which mix different interpretations of ‘know’.
On Lewis’s account, which relation is picked out by ‘knows’ depends on what
possibilities are salient to, or taken seriously by, the speakers. In our example,
Soraya is not, I assume, taking seriously the possibility that the lighting is odd—if
she did take that possibility seriously, she wouldn’t take herself to know that the
wall is red. There are thus two senses of ‘know’ in play in the situation; since it
20 See Hawthorne (2004) and Blome-Tillman (2009, 2014) for discussion.
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takes more to know in our sense than in Soraya’s, I will use ‘knowhi’ to name the
relation ‘know’ refers to when the contextual parameter is filled with the
possibilities we take seriously, and ‘knowlo’ for the relation it refers to when the
contextual parameter is filled with the possibilities Soraya takes seriously.21
ElusiveK:K then entails only that if Soraya doesn’t knowhi, she knowshi that she
doesn’t knowhi; and I will show that the Lewisian has principled reason to deny that
this conflicts with our intuitive judgement that Soraya fails to know without
knowing that she does.
Let us begin by looking at what Soraya knows or believes about what she
knowslo and knowshi about the wall. It seems pretty clear that she believes that she
knowslo that the wall is red. That belief is why Soraya is inclined to say that the wall
is red, and that she knows this, when talking with people that she takes to share her
epistemic standards.22 The belief is false, since the fact that the lighting is actually
unreliable means that Soraya has to rule out possibilities with misleading lighting
even to knowlo. In spite of being false, however, the belief is perfectly reasonable:
had the environment been more cooperative, Soraya wouldn’t have had to rule out
possibilities with misleading lighting to knowlo; and Soraya has no reason to suspect
the lack of cooperation.
A belief that she knowshi that the wall is red is quite a different matter. After all,
it’s clear from the meaning of ‘knowhi’ that one doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red
unless one can rule out the possibility of misleading lighting, no matter how
dissimilar such worlds are from the actual situation. And Soraya can tell that she is
in no position to rule out possibilities with misleading lighting. A belief that she
knowshi that the wall is red would thus be a highly unreasonable belief for her to
have; and since Soraya (like all subjects satisfying the idealizations implicit in our
reconstruction of Lewis) is rational, she doesn’t have such unreasonable beliefs.
This last point can be strengthened. Since it is clear to Soraya that she can’t rule
out possibilities in which the lighting is misleading, she is well aware that she
doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red. Or, at least, she is aware of this if she has ever
thought about what she knowshi at all; and, in keeping with our Lewisian
idealizations, we shall assume that she has.23 So we have that Soraya believes that
she doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red, and that this belief (being based purely on
21 This may be a little misleading, since, as I argue later, it’s not very intuitive to think that our standards
for knowledge are higher than Soraya’s, which is what the notation suggests.
22 In saying this, we can be neutral on whether this is the belief expressed by her utterance, as it might not
be if her conversational partners do not, in fact, take the same things seriously as she does. See DeRose
(2004) for discussion.
23 One might worry that this is in tension with our stipulation that Soraya is ignoring the possibility of
misleading lighting; for if she is, how could she even articulate what it takes to knowhi? If ‘ignoring’ is
understood in terms of presuppositions, the worry is easily dissolved, since Soraya can think about the
possibilities of misleading lighting when determining what she knowshi without taking them seriously;
that is, presumably, what most contextualists do when they agree that they know very little by sceptical
standards. If ‘ignoring’ is understood in terms of salience, the worry has more bite; but we can still
imagine that Soraya reflected earlier about what she would knowhi in various situation, and that those
earlier beliefs, which do not feature amongst her conscious thoughts when she is looking at the wall, are
sufficient to constitute a belief that she does not knowhi that the wall is red.
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introspection into her evidence and a priori reasoning) amounts to knowledge in
every relevant sense.
(At this point, it might start to seem as though our idealizing assumption—that
Soraya’s beliefs are consistent and include everything entailed by her evidence—is
pulling a lot of weight. But it would, I think, be a mistake to blame the surprising
ElusiveK:K on the strength of these idealizations. For we also want to say that
Soraya’s case is one in which she fails to know but is in no position to know that she
so fails. Yet, even if Soraya were less ideal than we have been assuming, the above
considerations would still suggest that she is at least in a position to know that she
doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red.)
Here, then, are the natural predictions of the Lewisian account:
(a) Soraya doesn’t knowlo that the wall is red.
(b) Soraya believes that she knowslo that the wall is red.
(c) Soraya doesn’t believe/knowlo/knowhi that she doesn’t knowlo that the wall is
red.
(d) Soraya doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red.
(e) Soraya does not believe that she knowshi that the wall is red.
(f) Soraya believes/knowslo/knowshi that she doesn’t knowhi that the wall is red.
Do these allow us to recover the obvious natural language judgements, such as
‘Soraya thinks she knows that the wall is red’? They do, if we combine them with a
surprising claim about how the context-sensitivity of ‘know’ is resolved when the
word occurs embedded in an attitude ascription. For in order to get the obvious
judgement to come out true, we have to say that ‘know’, when embedded under
‘Soraya thinks that’, means knowlo – even when said by us, with our high standards.
More generally, we have to say that when ‘know’ is embedded in an attitude
ascription, the contextual parameter relative to which it is interpreted is supplied not
by the context of utterance, but by something like the private context of the subject
of the attitude ascription.
I will revisit the plausibility of this linguistic claim shortly. For now, we should
simply note that, if it is correct, it also reconciles our example with ElusiveK:K. It
is natural for us to judge that, even though Soraya doesn’t know that the wall is red,
she doesn’t know that she doesn’t know this; this seems to be in tension with
ElusiveK:K because we are attending to and taking seriously Soraya’s situation.
However, if the above linguistic claim is correct, the tension is illusory. For our
judgement then amounts to the observation that Soraya doesn’t knowhi that she
doesn’t knowlo that the wall is red. And the Lewisian description of the situation
vindicates that judgement: Soraya has no reason to suspect that she doesn’t knowlo
that the wall is red. ElusiveK:K entails only that Soraya knowshi that she doesn’t
knowhi that the wall is red. And, as we saw above, that is actually a plausible thing
to say about the situation.
This reconciliation relies on a linguistic hypothesis: that when ‘know’ is
embedded in an attitude ascription, the contextual parameter relative to which it is
interpreted is supplied not by the context of utterance, but by something like the
private context of the subject of the attitude ascription. If this were a feature not
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shared by other context-sensitive vocabulary, this would be an implausible
consequence of the Lewisian account. But, fortunately for the Lewisian, there is
independent reason to think that this kind of behaviour is actually quite common.
For consider two other expressions which are naturally treated as context-sensitive:
‘fun’ and ‘might’. It looks as though, usually, the contextual parameter (a standard
of taste or evaluation, a body of information) is provided by the context of utterance:
when we say that something is fun, we mean that it is fun for us, and when we say
that something might be true, we mean that its truth is compatible with the
information available to us. However, when these expressions are embedded in
belief attributions, this natural treatment seems to go wrong. Consider:
(1) Soraya thinks that roller-coasters are fun.
(2) Soraya thinks that it might be raining in Abidjan.
Intuitively, (1) is true whenever Soraya thinks that roller-coasters are fun for her;
she might be well aware that we abhor them, so that ‘Soraya thinks that roller-
coasters are fun for us’ is definitely false. Similarly, (2) is true even when Soraya
knows that we are better informed about the weather in Abidjan than she is, and thus
suspends judgement on whether, for all you and I know, it might be raining in
Abidjan. This suggests that, when they occur embedded in attitude ascriptions, the
parameter for these expressions is usually supplied not by the context of utterance
but by a derived context which is particularly sensitive to the subject of the
embedding verb. And that is exactly the same as what our Lewisian wants to say
about ‘know’.24
It’s worth emphasizing that this line of reasoning cannot be used to defend the
stronger claim that the K:K principle is valid. Our reasoning shows that the
example described needn’t be a counterexample to the claim that, if someone
doesn’t knowhi that p, they knowhi that they don’t knowhi that p. But the case is a
genuine counterexample to the claim that, if someone doesn’t knowlo that p, they
24 The thought that context-sensitive expressions embedded in attitude ascriptions are not simply
interpreted relative to the context of utterance is quite familiar; see e.g. Stalnaker (1988) for a classic
articulation and defence. It is frequently applied by contextualists to handle embeddings under ‘says that’
or ‘believes that’; see e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009).
This strategy does face an important challenge with embeddings under factive attitude verbs such as
‘knows’ [cf Weatherson (2008) and Lasersohn (2009, pp. 369–372)]. For it seems to predict that we could
say ‘Soraya knows that roller-coasters are fun’, even though we hate them (provided only that we think
that Soraya loves them and knows that she does), which is clearly incorrect. We thus need to supplement
the simple shifting story with a, perhaps pragmatic, account of why knowledge ascriptions seem to entail
the proposition which their complement would have expressed had it not been embedded. But note that
simply denying that embedding under ‘knows’ (unlike embedding under ‘believes’) shifts the parameter
is also implausible. For we can say ‘Soraya knows roller-coasters are fun’ even if we know that she
(falsely) believes that we hate them.
A less optimistic reaction to these problems is to conclude that they sink contextualism about such
terms as ‘fun’ or ‘might’, and should push us towards relativism or expressivism instead. But then it
seems like we could equally well rehabilitate a broadly Lewisian account of ‘knows’ in a relativist or
expressivist framework. Abandoning the contextualist aspect of Lewis’s account for relativism or
expressivism seems to preserve all the applications Lewis makes of his contextualism; and it may have
independent advantages, as claimed by MacFarlane (2005) for relativism and Chrisman (2007) for
expressivism.
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knowlo that they don’t knowlo that p. For, in the case described, Soraya doesn’t
knowlo that the wall is red—there are worlds that relevantly resemble the actual one
in which it isn’t (for all we’ve said, the actual world is such a world), and even
knowinglo requires that one rule those out. But she (reasonably enough) thinks that
she does knowlo that the wall is red, and thus doesn’t knowlo that she doesn’t knowlo
this. So the K:K principle for knowlo (and thus the general K:K principle) is
refuted by the example; it’s just that, since the attributor’s use of ‘know’ does not
refer to knowlo, this does not refute the more modest claim that the K:K principle
for the relation attributors pick out with ‘know’ can fail only in cases which are
ignored by those attributors.
How convincing is this hard-nosed response? I think that it is most attractive
when the difference in what is presupposed by subject and attributors intuitively
amounts to a difference in epistemic standards. By Soraya’s standards, one does not,
in general, have to verify that the lighting is good in order to use one’s vision to
know what colour an object is. By our standards, one does have to rule out such
possibilities. Soraya knows that she doesn’t know by our standards. But she
reasonably (though falsely) believes that she knows by hers.
However, not all cases in which some attributors attend to a K:K failure are
intuitively described as cases in which their standards differ from the subject’s. In
fact, even the case of Soraya needn’t be described as such. Perhaps we do not use
‘know’ in such a way that people need to, quite generally, rule out possibilities with
misleading lighting before they can know the colour of an object. We think that
many people know the colours of lots of things despite never performing such
checks. We just also know about Soraya’s specific situation, we know that the
lighting in that specific room is unreliable, and thus want to deny knowledge to her
in particular. If that is the situation, it doesn’t seem as natural to describe us and
Soraya as differing in standards; hence it also doesn’t seem as natural to reconcile
the case with ElusiveK:K by appeal to the fact that ‘know’ means something
different for us than it does for Soraya.
(One might hope that such cases cannot arise: by the rule of resemblance, if the
attributors attend to any possibilities in which the lighting is misleading, every
subject has to rule out all of them before she can be said to know. But such a liberal
application of the rule of resemblance would be disastrous, at least if ‘ignoring’ is
understood in terms of presupposition.25 When I was 10, someone stole my bicycle,
so that it wasn’t where I left it when I went to look for it. Since I know this, there are
bike theft possibilities which are consistent with what I presuppose in almost any
conversation. It had better not follow that ‘know’, in my mouth, is so stringent that I
say something false whenever I claim of someone that she knows where her bike is.)
It should be noted that, even if it doesn’t seem particularly natural, the hard-
nosed strategy still applies in the cases where attributors and subject intuitively
share standards. Since Soraya is ignoring the possibility that the lighting in this
particular room is misleading, and we are not, the Lewisian theory predicts that we
25 If we understand ‘ignoring’ in terms of salience, we cannot handle the cases of hypothetical K:K
failures described above, since (i) a scenario is salient even if it is discussed only hypothetically, and (ii)
subject and attributor attend to all the same possibilities in that case.
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use the word ‘know’ differently—even if, in some intuitive sense, our epistemic
standards are the same. We can thus still appeal to the different interpretations of
‘know’ to reconcile the case with ElusiveK:K along the lines indicated above.
Doing so is not ad hoc, because the Lewisian theory predicts quite independently
that these two different interpretations will both be in play. If there is something
uncomfortable about the response, then, this is not because it is unnatural by the
Lewisian’s own lights. Rather, the response draws our attention to a feature of the
Lewisian account, that the range of possible interpretations might not correspond to
the range of epistemic standards, which some may find unattractive. In the next
section, I explore what happens to ElusiveK:K when we try to revise the Lewisian
account to avoid this feature. It turns out that this yields a different, but also quite
attractive, way of learning to live with ElusiveK:K.
2.2 A conciliatory response
We attend to the possibility that the lighting next door is misleading; in fact, we
positively affirm that possibility. Soraya ignores it. Yet, none of us are inclined to
generally take seriously such misleading lighting; and all of us are inclined to do so
when we have particular reason to be suspicious. There is thus a clear similarity
between our standards and Soraya’s, making it somewhat odd that the Lewisian
theory predicts that ‘know’ means something different relative to our different
contexts.
It will help to dig a little deeper into where, intuitively, the Lewisian theory goes
wrong. I suspect that the problem is that there are really two very different reasons
we have for taking possibilities seriously. Some we take seriously because our
standards require us to: you just don’t qualify for the kind of state we’re interested
in unless you have ruled these out. Others we take seriously just because we have
particular reasons to think that they obtain. Only the former reflect our standards,
and so only those who differ in what possibilities they take seriously for the former
reason should be classified as using ‘know’ differently.
Interestingly, this is something like a converse to the Problem of Known
Presuppositions discussed by Blome-Tillman (2012). Suppose that I’m in a ‘high
stakes’ situation: it really matters to me whether the bank will be open this Saturday,
because my paycheck needs to be paid in before Monday if I want to avoid
disastrous results.26 In fact, it matters so much that I’m initially inclined to take
seriously that the bank has changed its weekend opening hours during the last
month, which was the last time I checked. However, I am now looking at the bank’s
website, and can see that the opening hours haven’t changed, so I stop taking that
possibility seriously. Nonetheless, I am inclined to say ‘Omar doesn’t know that the
bank will be open tomorrow’ when all he has to go on is that it opened on Saturdays
a month ago; and this is true even if Omar, being in a low-stakes situation, believes
the bank to be open tomorrow. In this case, my standards seem to make relevant a
possibility which, because of the particular evidence I have, I don’t take seriously
26 Cf DeRose (1992).
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(in the sense that it is not compatible with my presuppositions); in the wall case, my
particular evidence makes me take seriously a possibility (that the lighting next door
is misleading) which my standards usually allow me to ignore.
We can solve both problems at once if we interpret ‘ignoring’ not in terms of
which possibilities we take seriously (i.e. are compatible with our presuppositions),
but rather in terms of which possibilities we consider ordinary or normal. When the
stakes are high, I take possibilities in which the bank changes its opening hours to be
sufficiently ordinary to be worth worrying about, regardless of whether I have
evidence that allows me to rule it out. Conversely, I might think of all cases of
misleading lighting as abnormal despite having evidence that a particular such case
has actually occurred. So, in the wall case, we attributors can agree with Soraya that
only possibilities with ordinary lighting are normal, so that ‘knowledge’ means the
same relative to our context and hers.
We thus avoid the somewhat counterintuitive feature of the Lewisian account
that the hard-nosed defence relied on. In doing so, we make room for a different
way of responding to ElusiveK:K. For that principle says that counterexamples to
K:K can only occur in worlds that are ‘ignored’ by the attributors of knowledge,
however that is spelled out. If ‘ignoring’ is understood in terms of presupposition or
salience, that seems implausible, so that an extended reconciliation along the lines
outlined in Sect. 2.1 is called for. But if ‘ignored’ is interpreted as meaning simply
‘is considered abnormal’, the result is not so surprising. When things are normal,
rational beliefs amount to knowledge; it is only when the environment is abnormally
uncooperative that they do not, leading to K:K failures. ElusiveK:K thus no
longer seems threatening.27
The cost of responding in this way is that, unlike the notion of a presuppositions
or of a possibility being salient, the notion of what attributors consider to be
ordinary or normal remains somewhat unclear and does not feature elsewhere in our
theories. But I do not here want to adjucate between the costs and benefits of the two
responses I have suggested. The important point is that, between them, they show
that ElusiveK:K is, initial appearances to the contrary, no reductio of a broadly
Lewisian approach to ‘knowledge’. The result is prima facie problematic if we
interpret S so that attending to a world or treating it as a candidate for actuality
automatically places it in S. Given such an understanding of S, however, the theory
straightforwardly predicts that subject and attributors will often use ‘know’
differently, thus enabling the Lewisian to endorse the hard-nosed response without
being ad hoc. If, on the other hand, we interpret S so that something more than
salience or being a serious candidate for actuality is required to place a world in S, it
27 Perhaps there will still be potential counterexamples in cases where attributors and subject do,
intuitively, differ in their standards. Suppose that we are sceptics, refusing to dismiss any possibilities as
abnormal. Should we describe ordinary people as failing to know without knowing that they fail? If so,
such an ascription will have to be handled via the ‘shifting’ strategy developed in Sect. 2.1. But I actually
have rather mixed feelings about this case; it strikes me as fairly natural to say that ordinary people, at
least those that have encountered sceptical worries, do know that they don’t really know, while a similar
claim sounds absurd to me in the case of Soraya (provided we hold fixed that, in Soraya’s case, the
attributors don’t generally take misleading lighting seriously). If that’s right, it suggests that shifting,
while perhaps possible, isn’t obligatory, which would make trouble for the hard-nosed response.
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is no longer clear that there is anything even prima facie implausible about
ElusiveK:K. Either way then, the Lewisian needn’t be worried.
3 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the status of the knowledge iteration
principles according to the account of knowledge given by Lewis in ‘‘Elusive
Knowledge’’. In Sect. 1 I showed how we could both (a) explain the wide-spread
impression that Lewis’s account vindicates the iteration principles and (b) confirm
that, in fact, Holliday (2015) is right to maintain that the account invalidates them
both; the key is to be careful to distinguish which parts of the account describe the
dependence of knowledge attributions on the attributor’s context and which parts
describe the dependence of knowledge attributions on the subject’s situation. In
Sect. 2 I argued that, once this ground has been cleared, there is more to be said:
while the K:K principle is invalid, counterexamples to it are, in a certain sense,
elusive, since they never occur in salient possibilities. I then argued that this
consequence is, initial impressions to the contrary, quite defensible.
There are two novel lessons from this discussion that deserve to be highlighted,
one general and one specific. The general lesson is that epistemic contextualism
interacts in subtle and surprising ways with the knowledge iteration principles. The
reason is that the contribution of context doesn’t vary with the world of evaluation;
it is therefore held fixed when we evaluate what is known at different worlds, and
hence held fixed when we evaluate what is known at worlds compatible with the
subject’s actual knowledge. If we aren’t careful, this can make iteration implausibly
easy, as on the account discussed in Sect. 1.1. And even if we are careful, it leads to
highly surprising theorems like ElusiveK:K. The connection is complicated
somewhat by the fact that, as noted in Sect. 2.1, contextualists can cite precedents
for holding that the contextual parameter with respect to which an embedded
knowledge attribution is interpreted need not always be the one provided by the
context of utterance. But this further complication doesn’t show that there aren’t
interesting interactions between contextualism and iteration principles; rather, it
shows that the interaction may be quite complex.
These interactions are worth studying for their own sake, as I’ve done here. But
they also highlight an under-explored difference between contextualist views and
their subject sensitive invariantist cousins.28 These two approaches diverge most
obviously when we consider third-personal knowledge ascriptions, where ascriber
and subject come apart, and those divergences have been discussed in some detail.
They may also diverge when it comes to counterfactual or temporal embeddings,
again because the contribution of context won’t vary as we shift the world (or time)
of evaluation, while the contribution of the subject’s situation will. To these known
divergence we should now expect to add a third: the two approaches should make
28 See Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005) for subject sensitive invariantist views, and detailed
discussion of their relation to contextualism.
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different predictions for iterated knowledge attributions. And this is exactly what we
find here, since no analogue of ElusiveK:K would hold if, in a subject-sensitive
invariantist spirit, we replaced the contextually supplied S with a relation RS
representing which possibilities are salient (to the subject, or the attributors, or
anyone else) from each world. I have not attempted a systematic evaluation of
which position does better with respect to this divergence; but I have argued that,
initial impressions to the contrary, contextualists needn’t be overly worried.
This brings me to the more specific lesson of our discussion. I have shown that
Lewis’s account entails ElusiveK:K; very roughly, the claim that counterexamples
to the K:K principle can occur only in possibilities that are being ignored.
Somewhat less roughly, rational subjects can fail to know, in the sense of
‘knowledge’ used by some attributors, without knowing that they fail to know in this
sense, only if they inhabit possibilities which those attributors are ignoring. Whilst
no doubt unexpected, I have argued that this consequence is not so surprising as to
be a reductio of the Lewisian account. But it is still surprising enough, I think, to be
epistemologically significant. Consider, for example, the Williamsonian E=K thesis
that one’s evidence consists of all and only the propositions one knows. Since the
K:K principle is non-negotiably false, this will mean that the iteration principles for
‘evidence’ will fail; and this, in turn, leads to counterexamples to otherwise
plausible ‘reflection principles’.29 By maintaining that counterexamples to the K:K
principle occur only in ignored possibilities, we may be able to ease this tension.
Under-described as it is, such an application remains a promissory note. But it is one
that we can only even think about writing as a result of the present discussion.
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